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Abstract— We discuss the use of elliptic curves in 
cryptography on high-dimensional surfaces. In particular, 
instead of a key exchange protocol written in the form of a 
bi-dimensional row, where the elements are made up with 
256 bits, we propose a Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
protocol given in a matrix form, with four independent 
entries each of them constructed with 64 bits. Apart from 
the great advantage of significantly reducing the number 
of used bits, this methodology appears to be immune to 
attacks of the style of Western, Miller, and Adleman, and 
at the same time it is also able to reach the same level of 
security as the cryptographic system presently obtained by 
the Microsoft Digital Rights Management. A nonlinear 
differential equation (NDE) admitting the elliptic curves as 
a special case is also proposed. The study of the class of 
solutions of this NDE is in progress. 
Keywords— Elliptic-curve cryptography, Elliptic-curve 
discrete log problem, Public key cryptography, Nonlinear 
differential equations. 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
As known, encryption is the conversion of electronic data 
into another form, called ciphertext, which cannot be easily 
understood by anyone except authorized parties. The 
primary purpose of encryption is to protect the 
confidentiality of digital data stored on computer systems 
or transmitted via the Internet or other computer networks. 
Encryption algorithms can provide not only 
confidentiality, but also authentication (i.e., the origin 
message is verified), integrity (i.e., the contents of the 
message have not been changed), and non-repudiation (i.e., 
the sender cannot deny to be the author of the message) 
[1,2]. Elliptic curves are more and more used in 
cryptography [3,4]. The main advantages to use the elliptic 
curves in cryptography is that shorter encryption keys use 
fewer memory and CPU resources [5]. The main concept 
behind this is the use of the so-called one-way functions. A 
one-way function is a function for which it is relatively 
easy to compute the image of some elements in the domain 
but it is extremely difficult to reverse this process and 
determine the original element solely based on the given 
image [6]. More precisely, according to the Federal Office 
for Information Security (BSI), the recommended security 
parameters for elliptic curves is 256 bits (standards during 
the years 2017-2021) [7]. However, to manipulate data 
with this degree of security is computationally expensive 
and often impossible on embedded systems. At present 
many industrial systems adopt (much) less secure 
methodologies. This necessitates a re-evaluation of our 
cryptographic strategy. The question is: are we able to 
obtain the same degree of security with small embedded 
microprocessors managing only 64-bit operations? The 
solution of this problem entails several steps: 
A) First step: Research 
The solution of this problem requires new mathematical 
concepts and algorithms.  
B) Second step: Commercialization 
Once found the solution, the process is concluded with the 
start-up of the commercialization of the product. 
This manuscript deals only with the first step. We shall 
introduce a hyper-surface in an arbitrary (𝑛#+1)-­‐
dimensional space with n denoting a positive integer 
number), and we use the idea of the one-way function 
possessing also the property of being a trap function. The 
encrypted shared-key, instead to be written as a (very 
large) scalar number is brought into a matrix form. We 
shall prove that we may obtain the same degree of security 
as the one obtained by the Microsoft Digital Rights 
Management by sending an encrypted shared-matrix with 
four independent entries, each of them made up by 64 bits. 
The encrypted information is successively transmitted 
through elliptic curves obtained by projecting the hyper-
surface imbedded in a (𝑛#+1)-­‐dimensional space onto 
perpendicular planes. This methodology allows reaching 
the same level of security as the cryptographic system 
presently obtained by the Microsoft Digital Rights 
Management [8]. 
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The manuscript is organized as follows. In Section (II) we 
introduce high-dimensional surfaces cryptography 
(HDSC) and the elliptic curves constructed through these 
hyper-surfaces. Without loss of generality, we shall limit 
ourselves to the case of 𝑛 = 2 (i.e., to a 5𝐷-space). The 
generalization to (𝑛# + 1)-dimensional space is 
straightforward. The definition of the groups in elliptic 
curves on high-dimensional surfaces and the elliptic curve 
discrete log problem can be found in the Subsections (II-
A) and (II-B), respectively. Concluding remarks are 
reported in the Section (IV). 
 
II.   ELLIPTIC-CURVES CRYPTOGRAPHY ON 
HIGH DIMENSIONAL SURFACES 
We illustrate the methodology by dealing with a five-
dimensional elliptic curve, even though the procedure is 
straightforwardly generalized to elliptic curves on surfaces 
imbedded in an arbitrary (𝑛#+1)-dimensional space, with 
n denoting a positive integer number (the reason for which 
only spaces of such dimension are allowed will soon be 
clear). For the sake of simplicity, in this work we shall limit 
ourselves to the analysis of elliptic curves on 5-
dimensional surfaces. The generalization to the general 
case (i.e., to the case of elliptic curves on (𝑛#+1)-hyper-
surface) is straightforward1. In a 5-dimensional space, the 
surfaces on which the elliptic curves are defined, are the 
solutions of the equation 
with 𝑎,	  (𝑖 = 1, … , 4) and  𝑏 denoting elements of the field 𝐾. Examples of fields 𝐾 are the Real Numbers, 𝑅, the 
Rational Numbers, 𝑄, the Complex Numbers, 𝐶, or the 
Integers modulo 𝑝, 𝑍/𝑝𝑍. By fixing three of the four 
variables 𝑥, (by setting, for example, 𝑥# = 𝑐# = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡., 𝑥? = 𝑐? = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡. and 𝑥? = 𝑐? = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡.) and by rotating 
the indexes, Eq.(1) defines together with the points at 
infinity 𝑂, four distinguished two-dimensional elliptic 
curves 𝐸,:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In fact, we anticipate that the encrypted code involves 
only square matrices of order 𝑛×𝑛 - see next Section. 
with   𝑖 = 1, … , 4   and  
 
being 𝑐,	  (𝑖 = 1, … , 4) elements of 𝐾. In order to avoid 
degeneracy, these parameters are subject to the following 
restrictions 
 
Clearly, in case of 𝐾 = 𝑍/𝑝𝑍 we may associate four 
modules 𝑝 to each elliptic curves. As we shall see in the 
forthcoming section, only elliptic curves on hyper-surfaces 
of dimension 𝑛2+1 (with 𝑛 denoting a positive integer 
number) are acceptable since the shared-key involves only 
square matrices of order 𝑛×𝑛 For illustration purpose 
only, Fig.(1) shows a three dimensional surface where the 
values of the parameters are 𝑎D = −4, 𝑎# = −5	  and 𝑏 =3.5	  . Figs.(2) and (3) refer to the elliptic curves obtained by 
projecting the surface (1) onto the planes 𝑥D = 1	  and 𝑥# =−2	  , respectively. 
A.   Groups in Elliptic Curves on High-Dimensional 
Surfaces 
Each elliptic curve 𝐸,, separately, defines under point 
addition an abelian group. For each  𝑃, ∈ 𝐸,, 𝑄, ∈ 𝐸, and 𝑅, ∈ 𝐸, the following properties are satisfied: 
•   Commutative: 𝑃, + 𝑄, = 𝑄, + 𝑃,; 
•   Identity: 𝑃, + 𝑂 = 𝑂 + 𝑃, = 𝑃,; 
•   Inverse:	  𝑃, − 𝑃, = 𝑃, + −𝑃, = 𝑂; 
•   Associative:	  𝑃, + 𝑄, + 𝑅, = (𝑃, + 𝑄,) + 𝑅, 
•   Closed: If	  𝑃, ∈ 𝐸, and 𝑄, ∈ 𝐸,, then 𝑃, + 𝑄, ∈ 𝐸, 
of the groups in elliptic curves on high-dimensional surfaces
and the elliptic curve discrete log problem can be found in
the Subsections (II-A) and (II-B), respectively. Concluding
remarks are r port d in t e Section (IV).
II. ELLIPTIC-CURVES CRYPTOGRAPHY ON HIGH
DIMENSIONAL SURFACES
W illustrate the methodology by dealing with a five-
dimensional elliptic curve, even though the procedure is
straightforwardly generalized to elliptic curves on surfaces
imbedded in an arbitrary (n2 + 1)-dimensional space, with n
denoting a positive integer number (the reason for which only
spaces of such dimension are allowed will soon be clear). For
the sake f simplicity, in this work we shall limit ourselves to
the analysis of elliptic curves on 5-dimensional surfaces. The
generalization to the general case (i.e., to the case of elliptic
curves on (n2 + 1)-hyper-surface) is straightforward1. In a 5-
dimensional space, the surfaces on which the elliptic curves
are defined, are the solutions of the equation
E =
n
(y, x1, x2, x3, x4) | y2 =
4X
i=1
x3i +A ·X+ b
o
(1)
where A ⌘  a1, a2, a3, a4  ; X ⌘
0BB@
x1
x2
x3
x4
1CCA
ith ai (i = 1, · · · , 4) and b denoting elements of the field K.
Examples of fields K are the Real Numbers, R, the Rational
Numbers, Q, the Complex Numbers, C or the Integers modulo
p, Z/pZ . By fixing three of the four variables xi (by setting,
for example, x2 = c2 = const., x3 = c3 = const. and
x4 = c4 = const.) and by rotating the indexes, Eq. (1) defines
together with the points at infinity O, four distinguished two-
dimensional elliptic curves Ei:
Ei =
n
(y, xi) | y2 = x3i + aixi + bi
o
[  O (2)
with i = (1, · · · , 4) and
b1 ⌘ b+ c32 + c33 + c34 + a2c2 + a3c3 + a4c4
b2 ⌘ b+ c31 + c33 + c34 + a1c1 + a3c3 + a4c4
b3 ⌘ b+ c31 + c32 + c34 + a1c1 + a2c2 + a4c4
b4 ⌘ b+ c31 + c32 + c33 + a1c1 + a2c2 + a3c3
being ci (i = 1 · · · 4) elements of K. In order to avoid
degeneracy, these arameters ar subject to the following
restrictions
4a31 + 27(b+ c
3
2 + c
3
3 + c
3
4 + a2c2 + a3c3 + a4c4)
2 6= 0 (3)
4a32 + 27(b+ c
3
1 + c
3
3 + c
3
4 + a1c1 + a3c3 + a4c4)
2 6= 0
4a33 + 27(b+ c
3
1 + c
3
2 + c
3
4 + a1c1 + a2c2 + a4c4)
2 6= 0
4a34 + 27(b+ c
3
1 + c
3
2 + c
3
3 + a1c1 + a2c2 + a3c3)
2 6= 0
1In fact, we anticipate that the encrypted code involves only square
matrices of order n⇥ n - see next Section.
Clearly, in case of K = Z/pZ , we may associate four modules
p to each elliptic curves. As we shall see in the forthcoming
section, only elliptic curves on hyper-surfaces of dimension
n2 + 1 (with n = denoting a positive integer number) are
acceptable since the shared-key involves only square matrices
of order n⇥n. For illustrati n purpose only, Figure 1 shows a
three dimensional surface where the values of the parameters
are a1 =  4, a2 =  5 and b = 3.5. Figures 2 and 3 refer to
the elliptic curves obtained by projecting the surface 1 onto
the planes x1 = 1 and x2 =  2, respectively.
A. Groups in Elliptic Curves on High-Dimensional Surfaces
Each elliptic curve Ei, separately, defines under point addi-
tion an abelian group. For each Pi 2 Ei, Qi 2 Ei and Ri 2 Ei
the following pr perties re satisfied:
• Commutative : Pi +Qi = Qi + Pi.
• Identity : Pi +O = O + Pi = Pi;
• Inverse : Pi   Pi = Pi + ( Pi) = O;
• Associative : Pi + (Qi +Ri) = (Pi +Qi) +Ri;
• Closed : If Pi 2 Ei and Qi 2 Ei, then Pi +Qi 2 Ei;
Each group identified by Ei is equipped with the standard
group operations [9], [10], i.e.
• Addition - If Pi = (Pixi , Piy) 2 Ei and Qi = (Qixi , Qiy) 2
Ei, then Pi + Qi = Ri [with Ri = (Rixi , Riy)], which
algebraically is defined as
Rixi = s
2
i   (Pixi +Qixi) (4)
Riy = si(Pixi  Rixi)  Piy
si =
Piy  Qiy
Pixi  Qixi
for i = (1, · · · , 4). As a particular case, we get 2P :
2Pixi = s
2
i   2Pixi (5)
2Piy = si(Pixi  Rixi)  Piy
si =
3P 2ixi + ai
2Piy
with i = (1, · · · , 4). The points at infinity are reached in each
elliptic curves Ei when Pi +Qi = O if Pixi = Qixi or when
y = 0 for point doubling (i.e., Pi + Pi = O).
• Scalar Multiplication - If P 2 Ei and  2 Z , Eq. (5)
allows defining the operation Q = P under the condition
that the operation Q = P ⌘ P + · · ·+ P , equal  times P ,
is performed by using the same elliptic curve Ei i.e., Q 2 Ei.
The scalar multiplication defines the one way function Q! P
where is very difficult to extract the value of .
• Reflection - The reflection of a point is its inverse. Hence
for Pi = (Pixi , Piy) the inverse of Pi is  Pi = (Pixi , Piy)
satisfying the relation Pi   Pi = O.
B. High-Dimensional Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem
For each Ei the scalar multiplication defines a one way
function [11]. Let us consider elliptic curves Ei(Z/piZ), with
pi = (p1, · · · , p4), and let and et Q1 and P1 two points
belonging to the same elliptic curve, say E1, with the condition
of the groups in elliptic curves on high-dimensional sur
and the elliptic curve discrete log problem can be fou
the Subsections (II-A) and (II-B), respectively. Concluding
remarks are reported in the Section (IV).
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being ci (i = 1 · · · 4) elements of K. In order to avoid
degeneracy, these parameters are subject to the following
restrictions
4a31 + 27(b+ c
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3
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3
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2 6= 0 (3)
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2 6= 0
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3
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3
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3
4 + a1c1 + a2c2 + a4c4)
2 6= 0
4a34 + 27(b+ c
3
1 + c
3
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3
3 + a1c1 + a2c2 + a3c3)
2 6= 0
1In fact, we anticipate that encrypted code involves only square
matrices of order n⇥ n - see next Sect on.
Clearly, in case of K = Z/pZ , we may associate four modules
p to each elliptic curves. As we shall see in the forthcoming
section, only elliptic curves on hyper-surfaces of dimension
n2 + 1 (with n = denoting a positive integer number) are
acceptable since the shared-key involves only square matrices
of order n⇥n. For illustration purpose only, Figure 1 shows a
three dimensional surface where the values of the parameters
are a1 =  4, a2 =  5 and b = 3.5. Figures 2 and 3 refer to
the elliptic curves obtained by projecting the surface 1 onto
the planes x1 = 1 and x2 =  2, respectively.
A. Groups in Elliptic Curves on High-Dimensional Surfaces
Each elliptic curve Ei, separately, defines under point addi-
tion an abelian group. For each Pi 2 Ei, Qi 2 Ei and Ri 2 Ei
the following properties are satisfied:
• Commutative : Pi +Qi = Qi + Pi.
• Identity : Pi +O = O + Pi = Pi;
• Inverse : Pi   Pi = Pi + ( Pi) = O;
• Associative : Pi + (Qi +Ri) = (Pi +Qi) +Ri;
• Closed : If Pi 2 Ei and Qi 2 Ei, then Pi +Qi 2 Ei;
Each group identified by Ei is equipped with the standard
group operations [9], [10], i.e.
• Addition - If Pi = (Pixi , Piy) 2 Ei and Qi = (Qixi , Qiy) 2
Ei, then Pi + Qi = Ri [with Ri = (Rixi , Riy)], which
algebraically is defined as
Rixi = s
2
i   (Pixi +Qixi) (4)
Riy = si(Pixi  Rixi)  Piy
si =
Piy  Qiy
Pixi  Qixi
for i = (1, · · · , 4). As a particular case, we get 2P :
2Pixi = s
2
i   2Pixi (5)
2Piy = si(Pixi  Rixi)  Piy
si =
3P 2ixi + ai
2Piy
with i = (1, · · · , 4). The points at infinity are reached in each
elliptic curves Ei when Pi +Qi = O if Pixi = Qixi or when
y = 0 for point doubling (i.e., Pi + Pi = O).
• Scalar Multiplication - If P 2 Ei and  2 Z , Eq. (5)
allows defining the operation Q = P under the condition
that the operation Q = P ⌘ P + · · ·+ P , equal  times P ,
is performed by using the same elliptic curve Ei i.e., Q 2 Ei.
The scalar multiplication defines the one way function Q! P
where is very difficult to extract the value of .
• Reflection - The reflection of a point is its inverse. Hence
for Pi = (Pixi , Piy) the inverse of Pi is  Pi = (Pixi , Piy)
satisfying the relation Pi   Pi = O.
B. High-Dimensional Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem
For each Ei the scalar multiplication defines a one way
function [11]. Let us consider elliptic curves Ei(Z/piZ), with
pi = (p1, · · · , p4), and let and et Q1 and P1 two points
belonging to the same elliptic curve, say E1, with the condition
of the groups in elliptic curves on high-dimensional surfaces
and the elliptic curve discrete log problem can be found in
the Subsections (II-A) and (II-B), respectively. Concluding
remarks are reported in the Section (IV).
II. ELLIPTIC-CURVES CRYPTOGRAPHY ON HIGH
DIMENSIONAL SURFACES
We illustrate the methodology by dealing with a five-
dimensional elliptic curve, even though the procedure is
traightforwardly generalized to elliptic curves on surfaces
imbedded in an arbitrary (n2 + 1)-dimensional space, with n
denoting a positive integer number (the reason for which only
spaces of such dimension are allowed will soon be clear). For
the sake of simplicity, in this work we shall limit ourselves to
the analysis of elliptic curves on 5-dimensional surfaces. The
generalization to the general case (i.e., to the case of elliptic
curves on (n2 + 1)-hyper-surface) is straightforward1. In a 5-
dimensional space, the surfaces on which the elliptic curves
are defined, are the solutions of the equation
E =
n
(y, x1, x2, x3, x4) | y2 =
4X
i=1
x3i +A ·X+ b
o
(1)
where A ⌘  a1, a2, a3, a4  ; X ⌘
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x1
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x4
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with ai (i = 1, · · · , 4) and b denoting elements of the field K.
Examples of fields K are the Real Numbers, R, the Rational
Numbers, Q, the Complex Numbers, C or the Integers modulo
p, Z/pZ . By fixing three of the f ur variables xi ( y setting,
for example, x2 = c2 = const., x3 = c3 = const. and
x4 = c4 = const.) and by rotating the indexes, Eq. (1) defines
together with the points at infinity O, four distinguished two-
dimensional elliptic curves Ei:
Ei =
n
(y, xi) | y2 = x3i + aixi + bi
o
[  O (2)
with i = (1, · · · , ) and
b1 ⌘ b+ c32 + c33 + c34 + a2 2 + a3c3 + a4c4
b2 ⌘ b+ c31 + c33 + c34 + a1c1 + a3c3 + a4c4
b3 ⌘ b+ c31 + c32 + c34 + a1c1 + a2c2 + a4c4
b4 ⌘ b+ c31 + c32 + c33 + a1c1 + a2c2 + a3c3
being ci (i = 1 · · · 4) el ments of K. In rder to avoid
degeneracy, these parameters are subject to the following
restrictions
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1In fact, we anticipate that the encrypted code involv s only square
matrices of order n⇥ n - see next Section.
Clearly, in case of K = Z/pZ , we may associate four modules
p to each elliptic curves. As we shall see in the forthco ing
section, only elliptic curves on hyper-surfaces of dimension
n2 + 1 (with n = denoting a positive integer number) are
acceptable since the shared-key inv lv s only square matrices
of order n⇥n. For illustration purpose only, Figure 1 shows a
three dimensional surface where the values of the parameters
are a1 =  4, a2 =  5 and b = 3.5. Figures 2 and 3 refer to
the elliptic curves obtained by projecting the surface 1 onto
the planes x1 = 1 and x2 =  2, respectively.
A. Groups in Elliptic Curves on High-Dimensional Surfaces
Each elliptic curve Ei, separately, defines under point addi-
tion an abelian group. For each Pi 2 Ei, Qi 2 Ei and Ri 2 Ei
the following properties are satisfied:
• Commutative : Pi +Qi = Qi + Pi.
• Identity : Pi +O = O + Pi = Pi;
• Inverse : Pi   Pi = Pi + ( Pi) = O;
• Associative : Pi + (Qi +Ri) = (Pi +Qi) + i;
• Closed : If P 2 Ei and Qi 2 Ei, then Pi +Qi 2 Ei;
Each group identified by Ei s equ pped w th the standard
group operations [9], [10], i.e.
• Addition - If Pi = (Pixi , Piy) 2 Ei and Qi = (Qixi , Qiy) 2
Ei, then Pi + Qi = Ri [with Ri = (Rixi , Riy)], which
algebraically is defined as
Rixi = s
2
i   (Pixi +Qixi) (4)
Riy = si(Pixi  Rixi)  Piy
si =
Piy  Qiy
Pixi  Qixi
for i = (1, · · · , 4). As a particular case, we get 2P :
2Pixi = s
2
i   2Pixi (5)
2Piy = si(Pixi  Rixi)  Piy
si =
3P 2ixi + ai
2Piy
with i = (1, · · · , 4). The points at infinity are reached in each
elliptic curves Ei when Pi +Qi = O if Pixi = Qixi or when
y = 0 for point doubling (i.e., Pi + Pi = O).
• Scalar Multiplication - If P 2 Ei and  2 Z , Eq. (5)
allows defining the operation Q = P under the condition
that the operation Q = P ⌘ P + · · ·+ P , equal  times P ,
is performed by using the same elliptic curve Ei i.e., Q 2 Ei.
The scalar multiplication defines the one way function Q! P
where is very difficult to extract the value o .
• Reflection - The reflection of a point is its inverse. Hence
for Pi = (Pixi , Piy) the inverse of Pi is  Pi = (Pixi , Piy)
satisfying the relation Pi   Pi = O.
B. High-Dimensional Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem
For each Ei the scalar multiplic tion defines one way
function [11]. Let us consider elliptic curves Ei(Z/piZ), with
pi = (p1, · · · , p4), and let and et Q1 and P1 two points
belonging to the same elliptic curve, say E1, with the condition
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Each group identified by 𝐸, is equipped with the standard 
group operations [9,10], i.e. 
•   Addition - If 𝑃, = 𝑃,J, 𝑃,K ∈ 𝐸,	  and 𝑄, =𝑄,J, 𝑄,K ∈ 𝐸,, then 𝑃, + 𝑄, = 𝑅, [with 𝑅, =𝑅,J, 𝑅,K ] which algebraically is defined as 
 
for 𝑖 = 	   (1, … , 4). As a particular case, we get 2𝑃: 
 
with 𝑖 = 	   (1, … , 4). The points at infinity are reached in 
each elliptic curves 𝐸, when 𝑃, + 𝑄, = 𝑂 if 𝑃,JL = 	  𝑄,JL or 
when 𝑦 = 0 for point doubling (i.e., 𝑃, + 𝑃, = 𝑂). 
•   Scalar Multiplication - If 𝑃, ∈ 𝐸, and 𝑘 ∈ 𝑍 Eq.(5) 
allows defining the operation 𝑄 = 𝑘𝑃 under the 
condition that the operation 𝑄 = 𝑘𝑃 ≡ 𝑃 + ⋯+ 𝑃 
equals 𝑘 times 𝑝 , is performed by using the same 
elliptic curve 𝐸, i.e., 𝑄 ∈ 𝐸,	  . The scalar multiplication 
defines the one-way function 𝑄 → 𝑃	  where is very 
difficult to extract the value of 𝑘 
of the groups in elliptic curves on high-dimensional surfaces
and the elliptic curve discrete log problem can be found in
the Subsections (II-A) and (II-B), respectively. Concluding
remarks are reported in the Section (IV).
II. ELLIPTIC-CURVES CRYPTOGRAPHY ON HIGH
DIMENSIONAL SURFACES
We illustrate the methodology by dealing with a five-
dimensional elliptic curve, even though the procedure is
straightforwardly generalized to elliptic curves on surfaces
imbedded in an arbitrary (n2 + 1)-dimensional space, with n
denoting a positive integer number (the reason for which only
spaces of such dimension are allowed will soon be clear). For
the sake of simplicity, in this work we shall limit ourselves to
the analysis of elliptic curves on 5-dimensional surfaces. The
generalization to the general case (i.e., to the case of elliptic
curves on (n2 + 1)-hyper-surface) is straightforward1. In a 5-
dimensional space, the surfaces on which the elliptic curves
are defined, are the solutions of the equation
E =
n
(y, x1, x2, x3, x4) | y2 =
4X
i=1
x3i +A ·X+ b
o
(1)
where A ⌘  a1, a2, a3, a4  ; X ⌘
0BB@
x1
x2
x3
x4
1CCA
with ai (i = 1, · · · , 4) and b denoting elements of the field K.
Examples of fields K are the Real Numbers, R, the Rational
Numbers, Q, the Complex Numbers, C or the Integers modulo
p, Z/pZ . By fixing three of the four variables xi (by setting,
for example, x2 = c2 = const., x3 = c3 = const. and
x4 = c4 = const.) and by rotating the indexes, Eq. (1) defines
together with the points at infinity O, four distinguished two-
dimensional elliptic curves Ei:
Ei =
n
(y, xi) | y2 = x3i + aixi + bi
o
[  O (2)
with i = (1, · · · , 4) and
b1 ⌘ b+ c32 + c33 + c34 + a2c2 + a3c3 + a4c4
b2 ⌘ b+ c31 + c33 + c34 + a1c1 + a3c3 + a4c4
b3 ⌘ b+ c31 + c32 + c34 + a1c1 + a2c2 + a4c4
b4 ⌘ b+ c31 + c32 + c33 + a1c1 + a2c2 + a3c3
being ci (i = 1 · · · 4) elements of K. In order to avoid
degeneracy, these parameters are subject to the following
restrictions
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3
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3
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3
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2 6= 0 (3)
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3
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2 6= 0
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3
1 + c
3
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3
4 + a1c1 + a2c2 + a4c4)
2 6= 0
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3
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3
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3
3 + a1c1 + a2c2 + a3c3)
2 6= 0
1In fact, we anticipate that the encrypted code involves only square
matrices of order n⇥ n - see next Section.
Clearly, in case of K = Z/pZ , we may associate four modules
p to each elliptic curves. As we shall see in the forthcoming
section, only elliptic curves on hyper-surfaces of dimension
n2 + 1 (with n = denoting a positive integer number) are
acceptable since the shared-key involves only square matrices
of order n⇥n. For illustration purpose only, Figure 1 shows a
three dimensional surface where the values of the parameters
are a1 =  4, a2 =  5 and b = 3.5. Figures 2 and 3 refer to
the elliptic curves obtained by projecting the surface 1 onto
the planes x1 = 1 and x2 =  2, respectively.
A. Groups in Elliptic Curves on High-Dimensional Surfaces
Each elliptic curve Ei, separately, defines under point addi-
tion an abelian group. For each Pi 2 Ei, Qi 2 Ei and Ri 2 Ei
the following properties are satisfied:
• Commutative : Pi +Qi = Qi + Pi.
• Identity : Pi +O = O + Pi = Pi;
• Inverse : Pi   Pi = Pi + ( Pi) = O;
• Associative : Pi + (Qi +Ri) = (Pi +Qi) +Ri;
• Closed : If Pi 2 Ei and Qi 2 Ei, then Pi +Qi 2 Ei;
Each group identified by Ei is equipped with the standard
group operations [9], [10], i.e.
• Addition - If Pi = (Pixi , Piy) 2 Ei and Qi = (Qixi , Qiy) 2
Ei, then Pi + Qi = Ri [with Ri = (Rixi , Riy)], which
algebraically is defined as
Rixi = s
2
i   (Pixi +Qixi) (4)
Riy = si(Pixi  Rixi)  Piy
si =
Piy  Qiy
Pixi  Qixi
for i = (1, · · · , 4). As a particular case, we get 2P :
2Pixi = s
2
i   2Pixi (5)
2Piy = si(Pixi  Rixi)  Piy
si =
3P 2ixi + ai
2Piy
with i = (1, · · · , 4). The points at infinity are reached in each
elliptic curves Ei when Pi +Qi = O if Pixi = Qixi or when
y = 0 for point doubling (i.e., Pi + Pi = O).
• Scalar Multiplication - If P 2 Ei and  2 Z , Eq. (5)
allows defining the operation Q = P under the condition
that the operation Q = P ⌘ P + · · ·+ P , equal  times P ,
is performed by using the same elliptic curve Ei i.e., Q 2 Ei.
The scalar multiplication defines the one way function Q! P
where is very difficult to extract the value of .
• Reflection - The reflection of a point is its inverse. Hence
for Pi = (Pixi , Piy) the inverse of Pi is  Pi = (Pixi , Piy)
satisfying the relation Pi   Pi = O.
B. High-Dimensional Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem
For each Ei the scalar multiplication defines a one way
function [11]. Let us consider elliptic curves Ei(Z/piZ), with
pi = (p1, · · · , p4), and let and et Q1 and P1 two points
belonging to the same elliptic curve, say E1, with the condition
of the grou s in elliptic curves on high-dimensional surfaces
and the elliptic curve discrete log problem can be found in
the Subsections (II-A) and (II-B), respectively. Concluding
remarks are reported in the Section (IV).
II. ELLIPTIC-CURVES CRYPTOGRAPHY ON HIGH
DIMENSIONAL SURFACES
We illustrate the methodology by dealing with a five-
dimensional elliptic curve, even though the procedure is
straightforwardly generalized to elliptic curves on surfaces
imbedded in an arbitrary (n2 + 1)-dimensional space, with n
denoting a positive integer number (the reason for which only
spaces of such dimension are allowed will soon be clear). For
the sake of simplicity, in this work we shall limit ourselves to
the analysis of elliptic curves on 5-dimensional surfaces. The
generalization to the general case (i.e., to the case of elliptic
curves on (n2 + 1)-hyper-surfac ) is straightforward1. In a 5-
dimensional space, the surfaces on which the elliptic curves
are defined, are the solutions of the equation
E =
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where A ⌘  a1, a2, a3, a4  ; X ⌘
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with ai (i = 1, · · · , 4) and b denoting elements of the field K.
Examples of fields K are the Real Numbers, R, the Rational
Numbers, Q, the Complex Numbers, C or the Integers modulo
p, Z/pZ . By fixing three of the four variables xi (by setting,
for example, x2 = c2 = const., x3 = c3 = const. and
x4 = c4 = const.) and by rotating the indexes, Eq. (1) defines
together with the points at infinity O, four distinguished two-
dimensional elliptic curves Ei:
Ei =
n
(y, xi) | y2 = x3i + aixi + bi
o
[  O (2)
with i = (1, · · · , 4) and
b1 ⌘ b+ c32 + c33 + c34 + a2c2 + a3c3 + a4c4
b2 ⌘ b+ c31 + c33 + c34 + a1c1 + a3c3 + a4c4
b3 ⌘ b+ c31 + c32 + c34 + a1c1 + a2c2 + a4c4
b4 ⌘ b+ c31 + c32 + c33 + a1c1 + a2c2 + a3c3
being ci (i = 1 · · · 4) elements of K. In order to avoid
degeneracy, these parameters are subject to the following
restrictions
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1In fact, we anticipate that the encrypted code involves only square
matrices of order n⇥ n - se next Section.
Clearly, in case of K = Z/pZ , we may associat four odules
p to each elliptic curves. As we shall see in the forthcoming
section, only elliptic curves on hyper-surfaces of dimension
n2 + 1 (with n = denoting a positive integer number) are
acceptable since the shared-key involves only square matrices
of order n⇥n. For illustration purpose only, Figure 1 shows a
three dimensional surface where the values of the parameters
are a1 =  4, a2 =  5 and b = 3.5. Figures 2 and 3 refer to
the elliptic curves obtained by projecting the surf ce 1 onto
the planes x1 = 1 and x2 =  2, respectively.
A. Groups in Elliptic Curves on High-Dimensional Surfaces
Each elliptic curve Ei, separately, defines under point addi-
tion an abelian group. For each Pi 2 Ei, Qi 2 Ei and Ri 2 Ei
the following properties are satisfied:
• Commutative : Pi +Qi = Qi + Pi.
• Identity : Pi +O = O Pi = Pi;
• Inverse : Pi   Pi = Pi + ( Pi) = O;
• Associative : Pi + (Qi +Ri) = (Pi +Qi) +Ri;
• Closed : If Pi 2 Ei and Qi 2 Ei, then Pi +Qi 2 Ei;
Each group identified by Ei is equipped with the standard
group operations [9], [10], i.e.
• Addition - If Pi = (Pixi , Piy) 2 Ei and Qi = (Qixi , Qiy) 2
Ei, then Pi + Qi = Ri [with Ri = (Rixi , Riy)], which
algebraically is defined as
Rixi = s
2
i   (Pixi +Qixi) (4)
Riy = si(Pixi  Rixi)  Piy
si =
Piy  Qiy
Pixi  Qixi
for i = (1, · · · , 4). As a particular case, we get 2P :
ixi = s
2
i   2Pixi (5)
2Piy = si(Pixi  Rixi)  Piy
si =
3P 2ixi + ai
2Piy
with i = (1, · · · , 4). The points at infin ty are reached in each
elliptic curves Ei whe Pi +Qi = O if Pixi = Qixi or when
y = 0 for point doubling (i.e., Pi + Pi = O).
• Scalar Multiplication - If P 2 Ei and  2 Z , Eq. (5)
allows defining the operation Q = P under the condition
that the operation Q = P ⌘ P + · · ·+ P , equal  times P ,
is performed by using the same elliptic curve Ei i.e., Q 2 Ei.
The scalar multiplication defines the one way function Q! P
where is very difficult to extract the value of .
• Reflection - The reflection of a point is its inverse. Hence
for Pi = (Pixi , Piy) the inverse of Pi is  Pi = (Pixi , Piy)
satisfying the relation Pi   Pi = O.
B. High-Dimensional Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem
For each Ei the scalar multiplication defines a one way
function [11]. Let us consider elliptic curves Ei(Z/piZ), with
pi = (p1, · · · , p4), and let and et 1 and P1 two points
belonging to the s lli ti r e, say E1, with the condition
fig.	  1:	  	  Only	  for	  illustration	  purpose,	  we	  show	  the	  two-­‐dimensional	  surface	  given	  by	  Eq.(2)	  with	  parameters	  𝑎D = −4, 𝑎# = −5	  and	  𝑏 = 3.5.	  However,	  one	  should	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  only	  elliptic	  curves	  on	  hyper-­‐surfaces	  of	  dimension	  𝑛2+1	  have	  real	  meaning	  (hence,	  
nly	   lliptic	  curves	  constructed	  by	   yper-­‐ urfaces	  of	  dimensions	  2,	  5,	  10,	  	  and	  so	  on,	  are	  acceptable).	  This	  because,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  
forthcoming	  section,	  th 	  encrypted	  c de	  involves	  only	  square	  matri es	  of	  order	  𝑛×𝑛. 
fig.	  2:	  Elliptic	  curve	  obtained	  by	  projecting	  the	  surface	  (1)	  onto	  
the	  plane	  𝑥D = 1. 
fig.	  3:	  Elliptic	  curve	  obtained	  by	  projecting	  the	  surface	  (1)	  onto	  
the	  plane	  𝑥# = −2. 
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•   Reflection - The reflection of a point is its inverse. 
Hence for 𝑃, = 𝑃,J, 𝑃,K  the inverse of 𝑃, is −𝑃, =𝑃,J, −	  𝑃,K  satisfying the relation 𝑃, − 𝑃, = 𝑂. 
B.   High-Dimensional Elliptic Curve Discrete Log 
Problem 
For each 𝐸, the scalar multiplication defines a one way 
function [11]. Let us consider elliptic curves 𝐸,(𝑍 𝑝𝑍), 
with 𝑝 = (𝑝D, … , 𝑝S) and let 𝑄D and 𝑃D two points 
belonging to the same elliptic curve, say 𝐸D,  with the 
condition that 𝑄_1 is a multiple of 𝑃D. As known, finding 
the value of the number 𝑘 such that 𝑄D = 𝑘𝑃D is a very 
difficult problem [12]. We introduce now the first base 
point (Generator), 𝐺D ≡ 𝐺J, 𝐺K \𝑖𝑛	  𝐸D(𝑍 𝑝𝑍). Since the 
group is closed, 𝐺D generates a cyclic group under point 
addition in the curve 𝐸D.	  	  The order 𝑛D (with𝑛D ∈ 𝑘) of 𝐺D 
is the number of the points in the group that 𝐺D generates. 
By this operation, we say that 𝐺D generates a subgroup of 
size 𝑛D, and we write 𝑜𝑟𝑑 𝐺D = 	  𝑛D. The order of the 
subgroup generated by 𝐺D is the smallest integer 𝑘D such 
that 	  𝑘DYZ = 𝑂 (hence,	  𝑛D < 𝑘D). 
After 𝑛D iterations on the curve 𝐸D we find a second base 
point (Generator), 𝐺# with coordinates 𝐺# 𝑛D =[𝐺J# 𝑛D , 𝐺K#(𝑛D)]. We may keep this second generator to 
perform 𝑛# iterations on the curve 𝐸#, with 𝑛# < 𝑘# being 𝑘# the order of the subgroup generated by 𝐺# on the elliptic 
curve 𝐸#. After 𝑛# iterations we get a third base point ( 
Generator), 𝐺? with coordinates 𝐺? 𝑛# =[𝐺J? 𝑛# , 𝐺K?(𝑛#)]. With this second generator we 
perform 𝑛? iterations on the curve 𝐸?, with 𝑛? < 𝑘? (with 𝑘? denoting the order of the subgroup generated by 𝐺? on 
the elliptic curve 𝐸? .After 𝑛? iterations on the curve 𝐸? we 
get the fourth base point (Generator), 𝐺S	  with coordinates 𝐺S 𝑛? = [𝐺JS 𝑛? , 𝐺KS(𝑛?)].. The process concludes 
after 𝑛S iterations on the elliptic curves 𝐸S (with 𝑛S less 
than 𝑘S the order of the subgroup generated by 𝐺S	  on the 
curve 𝐸S). At the end of these operations we get three 
matrices 𝑁, 𝐺 and 𝐾, of order 2×2, where the entries are 
totally independent from each others. Matrices 𝑁 and 𝐺 
reads2 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Note that, once generated, the elements 𝐺(𝑥D), 𝐺JL 𝑛,  
may be allocated as entries of the matrix 𝐺 in a random 
way.	  
The parameters that also Eve, the eavesdropper, possesses 
are (𝑝,, 𝑎,, 𝑏,, 𝐺, 𝐾) with 𝑖 = (1, … 4). 𝑝, specifies the 
modulo of the fields 𝐾,, 𝑎, and 𝑏, define the elliptic curves 𝐸,	  (notice that in general these curves are different from 
each others), 𝐺 is the Generator matrix and 𝐾 is the order 
of the subgroups generated by 𝐺,	  respectively. Now, if  Bob 
and Alice want to communicate with each other, Bob picks 
private key 𝑁 with 1 ≤ 𝑛, ≤ 𝑘, − 1, 𝑖 = (1, … 4). Bob 
computes matrix 𝑇 = 𝐺𝑁, which belongs to the curves 𝐸 
[given by Eq.(1)]. At the same time, Alice picks private key 𝑀 
 
where the entries 𝑚, satisfy the conditions 1 ≤ 𝑚, ≤ 𝑘, −1, 𝑖 = (1, … 4). Alice receives from Bob the information 𝑇 
and she generates the point 𝑀𝑇 = 𝑀𝐺𝑁 = 𝑊 (notice that 
matrices do not commute). Bob receives from Alice the 
information 𝑃 = 𝑀𝐺 and he computes 𝑃𝑁 = 𝑀𝐺𝑁 = 𝑊. 
Note that Bob multiplies matrices by placing 𝑁 always on 
the right, while Alice multiplies matrices by placing 𝑀 
always on the left. Both players, Bob and Alice, possess the 
same (encrypted) key 𝑊, which also belongs to the curve 𝐸 [given by Eq.(1)]. Eve, the eavesdropper, sees both 
information 𝑇 and 𝑃, but she is unable to retrieve the 
sheared-key 𝑊. Fig.(4) depicts the entire process. 
	  
fig.	   4:	   Diffie-­‐Hellman	   key	   exchange	   protocol	   [13]	   	   in	   high-­‐
dimensional	  elliptic	  curves	  cryptography.	  Bob	  and	  Alice	  exchange	  
on he curve E4). At the end of t ese operations we get three
matrices N , G and K, of order 2 ⇥ 2, where the entries are
totally independent from each others. MatricesN and G reads2
N =
✓
n1 n2
n3 n4
◆
; G =
✓
Gx1 Gx2(n1)
Gx3(n2) Gx4(n3)
◆
K =
✓
1 2
3 4
◆
(6)
The parameters that also Eve, the eavesdropper, possesses are
(pi, ai, bi, G,K) with i = (1, · · · , 4). pi specify the modulo
of the fields Ki, ai and bi define the elliptic curves Ei (notice
that in general these curves are different from each others), G
is the Generator matrix and K is the order of the subgroups
generated by G, r spectively. Now, if Bob and Alice want to
communicate with each other, Bob picks private key N with
1  ni  i   1, i = (1, · · · , 4). Bob computes matrix T =
GN , hich belongs to the curves E [given by Eq. (1)]. At the
same time, Alice picks private key M
M =
✓
m1 m2
m3 m4
◆
(7)
where the entries mi satisfy the conditions 1  mi  i  
1, i = (1, · · · , 4). Alice receives from Bob the information
T and she generates the point MT = MGN = W (notice
that matrices do not commute). Bob receives from Alice the
information P = MG and he computes PN = MGN = W 3.
Both players, Bob and Alice, possess the same (encrypted) key
W , which also belongs to the curve E [given by Eq. (1)].
Eve, the eavesdropper, sees both information T and P , but
he is unable to retrieve the sheared-key W . Figure 4 depicts
the entire process. We summarize the main advantages of our
proposed encrypting procedure.
• Eve does not know to which entry of the matrix G the
generators have been assigned;
• In case of 5D-elliptic curves, the process runs on four,
distinguished and independent, 2D-elliptic curves and the
encrypted key belongs to a 5D-surface. This hyper-surface
is constructed in such a way that the curves with variables xi,
obtained by setting constant the remaining variables of this
hyper-surface (i.e., by setting xj = const. with j 6= i), are
elliptic curves;
• The level of security remains unchanged. Indeed, it is easily
to convince ourselves that to obtain the same level of security
as in case of one-dimensional elliptic curve cryptography
(which requires 256 bits), we need to encrypt the shared-key
with only 64 bits (since in our case, for a shared-key written
in the form of a matrix 2 ⇥ 2 the level of security is of the
order of ↵4, with ↵ denoting the number of required bits).
We recall that the present methodology applies to elliptic
curves cryptography constructed on hyper-surfaces of dimen-
sion n2 + 1 (with n denoting an integer number) because the
shared-key is brought into the form of n⇥n square matrices.
2Note that, once generated, the elements Gx1 , Gxi (ni) may be allocated
as entries of the matrix G in a random way.
3Note that Bob multiplies matrices by placing N always on the right,
while Alice multiplies matrices by placing M always on the left.
Hence, a surface like Eq. (1) is the immediate generalization
of the one-dimensional elliptic curves cryptography (which
corresponds to n = 1). Hence, the subsequent surface which
generalizes Eq. (1) should be imbedded in a ten-dimensional
space (n = 3), and so on.
III. EXAMPLES OF PRACTICAL USES OF
HIGH-DIMENSIONAL ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY
The aim of this section is to illustrate the many possibilities
and practical usages opened by the introduction of High-
Dimensional Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Generally speaking,
HDECC can be applied instead of any use of the classic ECC;
i.e., Bitcoin, secure shell (ssl), transport layer security (tls)
[14]. Among these applications, one of the most important is
certainly tls. Indeed, tls is the new generation of the Secure
Socket Layer (ssl) which is used in any modern telecommu-
nication. For instance, the well-known https is nothing else
than the classic http protocol running within ssl/tls in order to
ensure a secured, bidirectional connection for arbitrary binary
data between two hosts. In order to establish a shared key
between these two hosts, the current implementations of tls
mainly relies on the DH or ECDH key exchange protocols
discussed in the previous sections.
However, introducing such security layers comes at the price
of overheads in terms of infrastructure costs, communication
latency, data usage, and energy consumption [15]. Therefore,
the first motivation of HDECC is to reduce the cost of
security in many of the today’s state-of-the-art communication
technologies. Moreover, reducing these costs makes the most
modern security protocols accessible for embedded systems
and wearable devices. Indeed, by using HDECC, we could
reduce the cost of these protocols by performing operations
on data four time shorter than before by maintaining, at the
same time, the same level of security. In addition, HDECC
opens new perspectives on elliptic curve cryptography as we
shall discuss in the next section.
IV. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
We have proposed an encrypted procedure based on the
high-dimensional elliptic curve cryptography, which allows
maintaining the same level of security as presently obtained
by the Microsoft Digital Rights Management. The advantages
of these methodology are multiplex.
1) The quite heavy intermediate exponential operations are
avoided and the key exchange protocol is constructed with 64
bits operations instead of 256 bits.
2) We may proceed to the construct of a new generation of
cryptographic standards working with the technology high-
dimensional elliptic curves.
3) This methodology opens new perspectives. In fact it is not
difficult to derive a nonlinear differential equation (NDE) ad-
on the curve E4). At the end of these operations we get three
matrices N , G and K, of order 2 ⇥ 2, where the entries are
totally independent from each others. MatricesN and G reads2
N =
✓
n1 n2
n3 n4
◆
; G =
✓
Gx1 Gx2(n1)
Gx3(n2) Gx4(n3)
◆
K =
✓
1 2
3 4
◆
(6)
The parameters that also Eve, the eavesdropper, possesses are
(pi, ai, bi, G,K) with i = (1, · · · , 4). pi specify the modulo
of the fields Ki, ai and bi define the elliptic curves Ei (notice
that in general these curves are differ nt from each others), G
is the Generator matrix and K is the or er of th subgroups
generated by G, respectively. Now, if Bob and Alice want to
communicate with each other, Bob picks private key N with
1  ni  i   1, i = (1, · · · , 4). Bob computes matrix T =
GN , which belongs to the curves E [given by Eq. (1)]. At the
same time, Alice picks private key M
M =
✓
m1 m2
m3 m4
◆
(7)
here the entries mi satisfy the conditions 1  mi  i  
1, i = (1, · · · , 4). Alice receives from Bob the information
T and she generates the point MT = MGN = W (notice
that matrices do not commute). Bob receives from Alice the
information P = MG and he computes PN = MGN W 3.
Both players, Bob and Alice, p ssess th same (encrypted) key
W , which lso belongs to the curve E [given by Eq. (1)].
Eve, the eavesdropper, sees both information T and P , but
he is u able to retrieve the sheared-key W . Figure 4 depicts
the entire process. We summarize the main advantages of our
proposed encrypting procedure.
• Eve does not know to which entry of the matrix G the
generators have been assigned;
• In case of 5D-elliptic curves, the process runs on four,
distinguished and independent, 2D-elliptic curves and the
e crypted key belongs to a 5D-surface. This hyper-surface
is constructed in such a way that the curves with variables xi,
obtained by setting constant the remaining variables of this
hyper-surface (i.e., by setting xj = const. with j 6= i), are
elliptic curves;
• The level of security remains unchanged. Indeed, it is easily
to convince ourselves that to obtain the same level of security
as in case of ne-dimensional elliptic curve cryptograp y
(which requires 256 bits), we need to encrypt th shared-key
with only 64 bits (since in our case, for a shared-key written
in the form of a matrix 2 ⇥ 2 the level of security is of the
order of ↵4, with ↵ denoting the number of required bits).
We recall that the present methodology applies to elliptic
curves cryptography constructed on hyper-surfaces of dimen-
sion n2 + 1 (with n den ting an i teger number) becau e the
shared-key is brought into the form of n⇥n square matrices.
2Note that, once generated, the elements Gx1 , Gxi (ni) may be allocated
as entries of the matrix G in a random way.
3Note that Bob multiplies matrices by placing N always on the right,
while Alice multiplies matrices by placing M always on the left.
Hence, a surface like Eq. (1) is the immediate generalization
of the one-dimensional elliptic curves cryptography (which
corresponds to n = 1). Hence, the subsequent surface which
generalizes Eq. (1) should be imbedded in a ten-dimensional
space (n = 3), and so on.
III. EXAMPLES OF PRACTICAL USES OF
HIGH-DIMENSIONAL ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY
The aim of this section is to illustrate the many possibilities
and practical usages opened by the introduction of High-
Dimensional Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Generally speaking,
HDECC can be applied instead of any use of the classic ECC;
i.e., Bitcoin, secure shell (ssl), transport layer security (tls)
[14]. Among these applications, one of the most important is
certainly tls. Indeed, tls is the new generation of the Secure
Socket Layer (ssl) which is used in any modern telecommu-
nication. For instance, the well-known https is nothing else
than the classic http protocol running within ssl/tls in order to
ensure a secured, bidirectional connection for arbitrary binary
data between two hosts. In order to establish a shared key
between these two hosts, the current implementations of tls
mainly relies on the DH or ECDH key exchange protocols
discussed in the previous sections.
However, introducing such security layers comes at the price
of overheads in terms of infrastructure costs, communication
latency, data usage, and energy consumption [15]. Therefore,
the first motivation of HDECC is to reduce the cost of
security in many of the today’s state-of-the-art communication
t chnologies. Moreover, reducing these costs makes the most
modern security protocols accessible for embedded systems
and wearable devices. Indeed, by using HDECC, we could
reduce the cost of these protocols by performing operations
on data four time shorter than before by maintaining, at the
same time, the same level of security. In addition, HDECC
opens new perspectives on elliptic curve cryptography as we
shall discuss in the next section.
IV. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
We have proposed an encrypted procedure based on the
high-dimensional elliptic curve cryptography, which allows
maintaining the same level of security as presently obtained
by the Microsoft Digital Rights Management. The advantages
of these methodology are multiplex.
1) The quite heavy intermediate exponential operations are
avoided and the key exchange protocol is constructed with 64
bits operations instead of 256 bits.
2) We may proceed to the construct of a new generation of
cryptographic standards working with the technology high-
dimensional elliptic curves.
3) This methodology opens new perspectives. In fact it is not
difficult to derive a nonlinear differential equation (NDE) ad-
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the	   encryption	   key	   in	   a	   matrix	   form,	  𝑊 = 𝑀𝐺𝑁,	   having	   four	  
independent	  entries	  each	  of	  them	  constructed	  with	  64	  bits.	  Eve,	  
the	   eavesdropper,	   may	   see	   𝑇 = 𝐺𝑁	   and	   𝑃 = 𝑀𝐺,	   but	   he	   is	  
unable	   to	   get	   the	   sheared	   Bob-­‐Alice's	   key	  𝑊	   since	   it	   is	   very	  
difficult	   to	   reverse	   the	   process	   and	   determine	   what	   was	   the	  
original	  information.	  
We summarize the main advantages of our proposed 
encrypting procedure. 
•   Eve does not know to which entry of the matrix G 
the generators have been assigned; 
•   In case of 5𝐷-elliptic curves, the process runs on 
four, distinguished and independent, 2𝐷-elliptic 
curves and the encrypted key belongs to a 5𝐷-
surface. This hyper-surface is constructed in such a 
way that the curves with variables 𝑥,, obtained by 
setting constant the remaining variables of this 
hyper-surface (i.e., by setting 𝑥d = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡. with 𝑖 ≠𝑗), are elliptic curves; 
•   The level of security remains unchanged. Indeed, it 
is easily to convince ourselves that to obtain the 
same level of security as in case of one-dimensional 
elliptic curve cryptography (which requires 256 
bits), we need to encrypt the shared-key with only 
64 bits (since in our case, for a shared-key written in 
the form of a 2×2 matrix, the level of security is of 
the order of 𝛼S, with 𝛼 denoting the number of 
required bits). 
We recall that the present methodology applies to elliptic 
curves cryptography constructed on hyper-surfaces of 
dimension 𝑛# + 1 (with 𝑛 denoting an integer number) 
because the shared-key is brought into the form of 𝑛×𝑛 
square matrices. Hence, a surface like Eq.(1) is the 
immediate generalization of the one-dimensional elliptic 
curves cryptography (which corresponds to 𝑛 = 1). Hence, 
the subsequent surface which generalizes Eq.(1) should be 
imbedded in a ten-dimensional space (𝑛 = 3), and so on. 
III.   EXAMPLES OF PRACTICAL USES OF 
HIGH-DIMENSIONAL ELLIPTIC CURVE 
CRYPTOGRAPHY 
The aim of this section is to illustrate the many possibilities 
and practical usages opened by the introduction of High-
Dimensional Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Generally 
speaking, HDECC can be applied instead of any use of the 
classic ECC; i.e., Bitcoin, secure shell (ssh), transport layer 
security (tls) [14].  Among these applications, one of the 
most important is certainly tls. Indeed, tls is the new 
generation of the Secure Socket Layer (ssl) which is used 
in any modern telecommunication. For instance, the well-
known https is nothing else than the classic http protocol 
running over ssl/tls in order to ensure a secured, 
bidirectional connection for arbitrary binary data between 
two hosts. In order to establish a shared key between these 
two hosts, the current implementations of tls relies on the 
DH or ECDH key exchange protocols discussed in the 
previous sections. 
However, introducing such security layers comes at the 
price of overheads in terms of infrastructure costs, 
communication latency, data usage, and energy 
consumption [15]. Therefore, the first motivation of 
HDECC is to reduce the cost of security in many of the 
today's state-of-the-art communication technologies. 
Moreover, reducing these costs makes the most modern 
security protocols accessible for embedded systems and 
wearable devices. Indeed, by using HDECC, we could 
reduce the cost of these protocols by performing operations 
on data four time shorter than before by maintaining, at the 
same time, the same level of security. In addition, HDECC 
opens new perspectives on elliptic curve cryptography as 
we shall discuss in the next section. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
We have proposed an encrypted procedure based on the 
high-dimensional elliptic curve cryptography, which 
allows maintaining the same level of security as presently 
obtained by the Microsoft Digital Rights Management. The 
advantages of these methodology are multiplex.    
1)   The quite heavy intermediate exponential operations 
are avoided and the key exchange protocol is 
constructed with 64 bits operations instead of 256 bits. 
2)   We may proceed to the construct of a new generation 
of cryptographic standards working with the 
technology high-dimensional elliptic curves 
3)   This methodology opens new perspectives. In fact, it 
is not difficult to derive a nonlinear differential 
equation (NDE) admitting the elliptic curves by a 
special choice of the parameters and initial conditions. 
We get 
 𝑦hh + 𝛼D 𝑥 𝑦iD #	  𝑦hh + 𝛼# 𝑥 𝑦iD #	  𝑦h + 𝛼? 𝑥 𝑦i? #	  𝑦hj+ 𝛾 𝑥 = 0 
 𝑦 0 = 𝛽D	  	  	  	  	  	  ; 	  	  	  	  	  𝑦′ 0 = 𝛽#                                        (8) 
 
with 𝛼, 𝑥 = 𝑎, + 𝑏,𝑥  (i=1,2,3)   ;   𝛾 𝑥 = 𝛾D + 𝛾#𝑥 
and 𝑎,, 𝑏,, 𝛽D, 𝛽#, 𝛾D, 𝛾# = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡.	  	  	                                   
 
with ′ denoting the derivative with respect to the variable 𝑥. Differential equation (8) is well-weighted with variables 𝑦, 𝑦h, 𝑦′′ and 𝛾 𝑥  having weight 1 and 𝛼,(𝑥) having 
weight 1 2, respectively. Note that the differential 
equation (8) admits as a special solution the Weierstrass 
equation [16] 
 𝑦# + 𝑐D𝑥𝑦 + 𝑐?𝑦 = 𝑥? + 𝑐#𝑥# + 𝑐S𝑥 + 𝑐n                      (9) 
 
with 𝑐, ∈ 𝐾. If 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝐾 ≠ (2,3), we can complete before 
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the square and, successively, the cube, by defining 
 𝜂 = 𝑦 + 𝑐D𝑥 + 𝑐?2 	  	   ; 	  	  𝜉 = 𝑥 + 𝑐D# + 4𝑐#12 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (10) 
 
By substituting Eqs (10) into Eq.(9), we get the elliptic 
curve [17]: 
 𝜂# = 𝜉? − 𝑑S48 𝜉 − 𝑑n864	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   11  
 
where 
 𝑑S = 𝑐D# + 4𝑐# # − 24 𝑐D𝑐? + 2𝑐S 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (12)                       𝑑n = − 𝑐D# + 4𝑐# ? + 36 𝑐D# + 4𝑐# 𝑐D𝑐? + 2𝑐S− 216(𝑐?# + 4𝑐n) 
 
Clearly, now the question is: how can we determine the 
largest class of parameters 𝑎,, 𝑏,, 𝛽D and 𝛽#, introduced in 
(8), such that the NDE (8) admits (only) a class of one way 
functions, possessing the property of being trap functions? 
In addition, we should also be able to define on these 
curves a group under point addition. Successively, the 
trapped curves could be identified uniquely by indexes. 
Being able to answer to this question would allow 
encrypting not only the key exchange protocol but also the 
trapped-curves on which the generator and the encrypted 
keys belong. However, all of this requires sophisticated 
mathematical tools and it will be subject of future works. 
 
We close this Section by mentioning two other relevant 
perspectives of this work. 
1)   It is quite evident that the formalism illustrated in this 
manuscript allows introducing two operations: matrix 
addition and scalar matrix multiplication (including 
the so-called matrix doubling operation). These 
operations can be used to implement a high-
dimensional version of algorithms such as the ECDSA 
(elliptic curves digital signature algorithm) [18]. 
2)   It is possible to introduce an operator 𝐿 which 
connects two distinct points 𝐺 D , 𝐺(#) on the high-
dimensional surface 𝐸 [see Eq.(1)] as follows 
 𝐺 D = 𝐿	  𝐺 # 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   13  
 𝐺JZ(D) 𝐺JjD (𝑛D)𝐺Ju(D) 𝐺JvD (𝑛?) = 𝐿 𝐺JZ(#) 𝐺Jj# (𝑛S)𝐺Ju(#) 𝐺Jv# (𝑛n)  
 
 
with 𝐿 denoting a non-singular 2×2 matrix, satisfying the 
group law under matrix multiplication. The analytic 
expression and the mathematical study of this matrix (and 
the 𝑛×𝑛 matrices, in general), with its potential application 
in cryptography, will be subject of a future work. 
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